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This paper discusses how international law has responded to climate change, focusing on 
challenges that have faced the implementation of existing climate treaties, and on the suitability 
of the Paris Agreement to address these. The paper specifically reflects on international law-
making and on the approach to international governance embedded in the Paris Agreement, 
drawing inferences from the past of the regime, to make predictions on what the future of 
international climate change law may hold.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since its adoption, the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)
1
 has had a rather eventful and dramatic history. In spite of having been ratified by 
virtually all States,
2
 and of the adoption of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,
3
 Parties to the Convention 
have struggled to reach the objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere ‘at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system’.4  
As a framework Convention, the UNFCCC does not contain much detail on action that Parties 
should undertake to achieve this objective. Instead, rather like other multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs), the convention largely focuses on setting out an institutional framework and 
a series of principles to guide Parties’ action.5 The UNFCCC thus performs a constitutional role, 
laying down the foundations of the climate regime. This regime has over the years been 
progressively constructed by means of the rule-making activities of treaty bodies, which, for 
example, established harmonized procedures concerning the reporting of Parties’ emissions.6 
International cooperation on climate change has henceforth been likened to the Cambrian 
explosion, whereby ‘a wide array of diverse institutional forms emerges, and through selection 
and accident a few are chosen’, and the UNFCCC process is ‘particularly important’ but ‘not 
unrivalled’.7 In its twenty odd years of existence, the international climate regime has become 
                                                     
1
  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 May 1992; in force 21 
March 1994) (‘UNFCCC’). 
2
  As of 31 January 2016, 197 Parties (including the European Union) have ratified the Convention. See 
UNFCCC, Status of Ratification, available at 
  <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/Convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php>.  
3
  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto, 11 
December 1997, in force 16 February 2005) (‘Kyoto Protocol’). 
4
  UNFCCC, Article 2. 
5
  UNFCCC, Articles 3 and 7-11, respectively. 
6
  The conceptualization on the constitutional vis-à-vis the regulatory and harmonization role of 
international law is operated in Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International 
Law and the Environment (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2009), at 9-10.  
7
  Robert O Keohane and David G Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2011) 9 
Perspectives on Politics 7, at 12. 
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increasingly compartmentalised and fragmented,
 8
 through the interaction of law-making and 
standard-setting processes carried out within and without the institutional scope of the UNFCCC.
9
  
These intense law- and institution-making activities have produced important results, when one 
considers the high level of compliance with Parties’ reporting obligations, as well as with the 
targets embedded in the Kyoto Protocol.
10
 Yet doubtlessly action undertaken to date is inadequate 
to achieve the objective identified in the UNFCCC, raising uncomfortable questions about the 
adequacy of the climate regime to provide actual solutions to the problem at hand. 
After much tribulation and the almost collapse of the whole architecture in 2009, the quest for the 
means to achieve the objective of the UNFCCC resulted in the 2015 Paris Agreement.
11
 
Following a record-breaking ratification process, the Agreement entered into force on 4
th 
November 2016, not even a year after its adoption.  
The expectations for this new treaty could hardly be any higher: the Paris Agreement embeds a 
new approach to international climate governance, which is expected to move Parties beyond the 
stalemate that has hindered progress towards tackling climate change. Formally the Paris 
Agreement can be regarded as an ancillary treaty to the UNFCCC,
12
 building on its principles
13
 
and institutional arrangements,
14
 and is explicitly meant to enhance its implementation.
15
 As such, 
the Paris Agreement does not dismantle the pre-existing international climate change law 
architecture, but rather builds upon it. Yet, the agreement embraces a new bottom-up approach to 
climate change governance, which postulates the re-design of the existing international climate 
change institutional and regulatory architectures. Most crucially, the Paris Agreement sheds no 
light on the future of the Kyoto Protocol, an embattled treaty that includes no sunset clause, but 
has clearly been superseded by circumstances and whose future Parties to the climate regime have 
long struggled to determine. 
This paper considers the evolution of international climate change law-making and governance, 
focussing on challenges that have faced the implementation of existing climate instruments, and 
on the suitability of the Paris Agreement to address these challenges. The paper follows a two-
                                                     
8
  As suggested for example in Cinnamon P Carlarne, ‘Good Climate Governance: Only a Fragmented 
System of International Law Away?’ (2008) 30 Law & Policy 450; and Harro van Asselt, Francesco 
Sindico and Michael Mehling, ‘Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International Law’ 
(2008) 30 Law & Policy 423; Harro van Asselt, The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance: 
Consequences and Management of Regime Interactions (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014).  
9
  On the informalization of the climate regime, see Harro van Asselt, Michael Mehling and Clarisse 
Siebert, ‘The Changing Architecture of International Climate Change Law’ in Geert van Calster, Wim 
Vanderberghe and Leonie Reins (eds), Research Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2015), at 5; and Duncan French and Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Climate Change 
and International Environmental Law: Musings on a Journey to Somewhere’ (2013) 25 Journal of 
Environmental Law 437, at 446. 
10
  See Michael Grubb, ‘Full Legal Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol’s First Commitment Period – 
Some Lessons’ (2016) Climate Policy 1. 
11
  Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 2015, not in force. 
12
  As argued also in Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement’ (n 1), at 20. 
13
  Paris Agreement, Preamble and Article 2. 
14
  Paris Agreement, Articles 16-18. 
15
  Paris Agreement, Article 2.1. 
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pronged approach. The first part reflects on international climate change law-making, and on 
what has changed with the adoption of the Paris Agreement. The second part of the paper 
considers the shift in international climate change governance, from the demise of the ‘targets and 
timetables’ approach embedded in the Kyoto Protocol, to its replacement with the ‘pledge and 
review’16 approach embedded in the Paris Agreement. While the suitability of the latter approach 
to deliver the solution to the climate change problem remains to be tested, this paper reflects on 
the past of the climate regime, to gauge where the implementation of the Paris Agreement may 
lead, as well as potential pitfalls lying ahead.  
 
2. International climate change law-making 
As all other climate treaties before it, the Paris Agreement will be formally binding upon its 
Parties. The scope of Parties’ obligations, nevertheless, will depend on the interpretation of the 
language in each provision of the treaty. Some provisions in the Agreement establish categorical 
obligations, such as, for example, that to pursue domestic mitigation measures.
17
 Others, instead, 
are expressed in less categorical terms, like that concerning developing countries move towards 
emission reduction targets.
18
 Others again have a merely enabling character, and aim to facilitate 
internationally coordinated action, rather than prescribe it – such as, for example, the provisions 
on the joint implementation of Parties’ mitigation obligations.19 The nature of obligations 
enshrined in the Paris Agreement therefore depends on the way they are termed in the treaty, and, 
most importantly, on Parties’ interpretation of these obligations in the practice of implementation. 
This practice may turn what may sound like hortatory provisions into a sophisticated web of 
reciprocal State obligations, and, conversely, turn into dead letter what were construed as 
categorical obligations.  
The climate regime provides eloquent examples of both. One example of the first is the body of 
rules concerning REDD+.
20
 These rules have emerged in a tumultuous fashion, from a long string 
of decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC,
21
 which are ex se 
                                                     
16  
The conceptualization of a pledge-and-review approach to climate governance is operated in the 
works of Daniel Bodansky, starting with Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Emerging Climate Change Regime’ 
(1995) 20 Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 425. 
17
  Paris Agreement, Article 4.2. 
18
  Paris Agreement, Article 4.4. 
19
  Paris Agreement, Article 6. 
20
  The acronym stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing 
countries, and the scope of activities covered was progressively expanded to cover also the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries (hence the ‘+’). See Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the 
Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (UN 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011), at paragraph 70. 
21
  These decisions are recalled in Paris Agreement, Article 5.2. 
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non-legally binding. This quintessentially bottom-up architecture has progressively hardened in a 
set of specific obligations, which now encumber Parties wishing to carry out REDD+ activities.
22
  
Conversely, the Kyoto Protocol features several examples of categorically formulated obligations 
that have progressively descended into irrelevance. The Protocol famously enshrined in its annex 
specific targets and timelines for the progressive reduction of emissions in developed countries. 
These targets and timelines were multilaterally negotiated in a process of political bargaining and 
formally enshrined in the Protocol,
23
 following the model deployed with the Montreal Protocol to 
the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
24
 Even though the Protocol 
unequivocally requires all developed country Parties to adopt targets for subsequent periods,
25
 
after the elapse of the first one, it was impossible to negotiate new targets for some developed 
country Parties. And even for those Parties who did undertake new targets, commitments for the 
period 2013-2020 are presently not formally binding, pending the entry into force of the related 
amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.
26
  
This interplay is far from unique to the climate regime. So-called ‘autonomous institutional 
arrangements’27 are a recurrent feature of MEAs and render international environmental law 
treaties living instruments into which, to say it with Brown Weiss, Parties ‘continuously breathe 
life and to which they give new directions by acting as informal legislatures.’28 MEAs treaty 
bodies perform a variety of law-making functions. At times these functions are an emanation of 
specific delegated rule-making powers.
29
 The rationale for delegating the adoption of such rules 
to treaty bodies is that to flexibly negotiate technical matters that need periodical review and 
adjustment and would scarcely be suited to be embedded in treaty text.
30
 Other times, decisions 
by treaty bodies may be regarded as authoritative interpretation of the terms of the treaties and the 
practice of implementation may render their decisions obligatory.
31
 Whether or not the decisions 
of treaty bodies acquire the guise of binding law, therefore, is a matter of context specific 
assessment and interpretation.
32
  
                                                     
22
  As argued in Christina Voigt, ‘Introduction: The Kaleidoscopic World of REDD’ in Christina Voigt 
(ed), Research Handbook on REDD+ and International Law (2016); and Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The 
Legal Status and Role of Safeguards’ in Christina Voigt (ed), Research Handbook on REDD+ and 
International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016). 
23
  Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.1 and Annex B.  
24
  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal, 16 September 1987, in 
force 1 January 1989). 
25
  Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.9. 
26
  Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, Doha, 8 December 2012, not in force. 
27
  See G Churchill and G Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 The 
American Journal of International Law 623. 
28
  Edith Brown Weiss, ‘The Rise or the Fall of International Law’ (2000) 69 Fordham Law Review 345, 
at 352. 
29
  See for example, Kyoto Protocol, Article 6.2. Compare also Churchill and Ulfstein (n 29), at 639. 
30
  As suggested in Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2007), at 216-220; and in Gregory C Shaffer and Mark A Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft 
Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’ (2009) 94 Minnesota 
Law Review 706, at 719.  
31
  As suggested also in Boyle and Chinkin (n 32), at 151-152. 
32
  As pointed out also in van Asselt, Sindico and Mehling (n 7), at 430.  
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Even within the context of MEAs, international climate change law is remarkable for its latitude. 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol may be regarded as conspicuous examples of living 
international law instruments, and the negotiated expression of Parties’ consensus embodied in 
guidance adopted by treaty bodies has become the backbone of the climate regime.
33
 The 
UNFCCC COP, its subsidiary bodies
34
 and their homologues under the Kyoto Protocol
35
 have 
been most prolific international law-making machineries. These bodies have adopted hundreds of 
decisions and established dozens of institutions, which together constitute one of the largest 
international environmental bureaucracies in existence. The treaty bodies of the climate regime 
have thus ‘amplified’ the terms of UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, filling in their ‘open-
textured’36 provisions with content, by adopting both hard rules that Parties are expected to 
uphold in implementing their obligations,
37
 as well as soft guidance that may be regarded as 
‘authoritative’ sources of interpretation of the terms of treaties, or even practice that concurs to 
the formation of customary rules.
 38
 
The recent adoption of the Paris Agreement marked the beginning of a new, predictably lengthy 
law-making process, whereby Parties will fill with content the open-textured provisions in the 
new treaty. Some details of this process are already charted in the COP decision that formally 
adopted the Paris Agreement.
39
 The decision entrusts some issues to the COP serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement; others to the body charged to prepare for its entry 
into force, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA); and others again to the 
UNFCCC subsidiary bodies.
 
In multilateral environmental governance prolonged rule-making is 
standard practice after constitutional moments, like the adoption of the Paris Agreement. 
Nevertheless, the path lying ahead of the APA is laden with potentially explosive issues, 
including the future of the Kyoto Protocol and of the institutions it created.  
Adjusting the extant institutional framework to support the implementation of Parties’ obligations 
will be a delicate task. While the debate on this issue has already started, it will take time and 
effort to revisit the present existing institutional and legal frameworks to adequately serve the 
purposes of the Paris Agreement. This challenging task is no mean undertaking for the climate 
regime’s treaty bodies, which typically operate on the basis of consensus. In a process with 197 
Parties, consensus is hard to obtain and often leading to lowest common denominator outcomes,
40
 
                                                     
33
  Along similar lines, see French and Rajamani (n 8), at 445.  
34
  UNFCCC, Article 7.2(i). 
35
  Kyoto Protocol, Article 13.4. 
36
  These expressions are used in Alan E Boyle, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and 
Soft Law’ (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 901, at 905. 
37
  Building upon specific mandates conferred upon them by the treaties, e.g. Kyoto Protocol, Articles 
3.4 and 12.7.  
38
  Cf. Boyle (n 25), at 905 and 903, respectively.  
39
  As detailed in Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, 
Add.1, 29 January 2016), at 26, 28, 31, 34, 92-95 and 100-102 for the Ad Hoc Working Group on the 
Paris Agreement; and 29, 34, 37, 39-41, 58, 68, 76-77 and 101 for the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice. 
40
  As suggested in Boyle and Chinkin (n 32), at 159. 
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and where institutional viscosity is the norm.
41
  
Another major element yet to be determined is the of role non-State actors in international climate 
change governance. International climate law-making has long been characterized by the 
participation of a very diverse constituency of non-State actors.
42
 Non-State actors may attend 
meetings of the Parties, without voting.
43
 These actors cannot formally participate in international 
law-making, but have over the years gained increasing visibility.
44
 In lead up to the adoption of 
the Paris Agreement, unprecedented UNFCCC initiatives showcased and promoted voluntary 
emission reductions by non-State actors such as companies and subnational governments.
45
 The 
preamble of the Paris Agreement builds upon these initiatives, recognizing for the first time in a 
climate treaty the importance to engage ‘all levels of government’ and ‘various actors’ in 
addressing climate change.
46
 Furthermore, while the UNFCCC already made generic reference to 
public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing adequate 
responses,
47
 the Paris Agreement specifically emphasizes enhanced public and private sector 
participation in the implementation of States’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs).48  
These recent developments largely focus on non-State actors’ engagement in the making and 
implementation of climate change action at the national, rather than at the international level. Yet, 
negotiations on arrangements for the review of implementation of the Paris Agreement may also 
open the door to greater non-State actors’ involvement in international climate change 
governance, for example enabling their participation in the review process, building upon 
precedents established with other MEAs. 
49 
 
Another element that came to fore during negotiations of the Paris Agreement is the need to build 
synergies with other international law forums whose mandate overlaps with that of the climate 
regime. The Paris Agreement has broken new ground by tracing explicit links between climate 
change and human rights,
50
 and its accompanying COP decision acknowledges the importance of 
liaising with other international processes on matters such as climate finance
51
 and human 
                                                     
41
  On the notion of viscosity, see Daniel W Drezner, ‘The Viscosity of Global Governance: When Is 
Forum-Shopping Expensive’ (2006) 
<https://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/IPES/papers/drezner_S1100_16.pdf> accessed 11 
October 2016. 
42
  Bas Arts, The Political Influence of Global NGOs: Case Studies on the Climate and Biodiversity 
Conventions (International Books 1998). 
43
  UNFCCC, Article 7.6 and, Kyoto Protocol, Article 13.8. 
44
  See e.g. Sander Chan et al., ‘Reinvigorating International Climate Policy: A Comprehensive 
Framework for Effective Non-State Action’ (2015) 6:4 Global Policy 466; and Sander Chan et al., 
‘Strengthening Non-State Climate Action: A Progress Assessment of Commitments Launched at the 
2014 UN Climate Summit’ (London School of Economics, 2015).  
45
  See Lima-Paris Action Agenda and the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) platform 
launched in 2014. 
46
  Paris Agreement, Preamble. 
47
  UNFCCC, Article 6 
48
  Paris Agreement, Article 6.8. 
49
  As suggested in Harro van Asselt, ‘The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, 
Implementation, and Compliance Under the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 6 Climate Law 91, at 96. 
50
  Paris Agreement, Preamble. 
51
  Decision 1/CP.21, at 44. 
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displacement.
52
 The years ahead will show whether and how these openings will provide new 
tools to tackle issues, like finance and human displacement, which have long been neglected by 
the climate regime. 
 
3. International climate change governance: from top-down to 
bottom-up 
The Paris Agreement enshrined in treaty form the bottom-up pledge-and-review approach to 
international climate governance emerged since the ill-fated Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference in 2009.
53
 This approach relies on Parties unilaterally declaring the action they intend 
to undertake to reduce their emissions, which is in turn to be subjected to a review process. In this 
context, the international climate change bureaucracy works as a notary collecting, and eventually 
enabling the review of the implementation of Parties’ pledged action. This new architecture 
leaves a very wide margin of discretion to States on how to contribute to the endeavor of tackling 
climate change.
 
 The Paris Agreement imposes upon each Party the obligation to prepare, 
communicate and maintain successive NDCs and to pursue mitigation activities at the national 
level.
54
 These obligations of conduct,
55
 whereby each Party is required to submit information on 
how they intend to reduce their emissions and by how much, are largely procedural in nature.
56
 
While no format for (intended) NDCs could be agreed ahead of the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, the conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties is expected to 
adopt specific guidance on this issue.
57
 This guidance is crucial to the review Parties’ action.  
The Paris Agreement lays out the foundations of a new system to review the effectiveness, 
implementation and compliance with Parties obligations.
58
 Even though the details of this 
architecture remain to be determined, it is worth reflecting on what is actually new in the legal 
framework established by the Paris Agreement, and why this is important. 
Before the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the climate regime was already equipped with tools 
to enable the review of implementation and compliance.
59
 The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
established two separate and overlapping review systems. The Kyoto Protocol and the decisions 
                                                     
52
  Decision 1/CP.21, at 50. 
53
  Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 March 2010. 
54
  Paris Agreement, Articles 3 and 4.2. 
55
  Paris Agreement, Article 4.2. 
56
  As argued also Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (forthcoming, 2016) 
25:2 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law; and Annalisa Savaresi, 
‘The Paris Agreement: A Rejoinder’ (EJIL: Talk!, 16 February 2016) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
paris-agreement-a-rejoinder/> accessed 20 April 2016. 
57
  Paris Agreement, Article 4.13; and Decision 1/CP.21, at 31. 
58
  This categorisation of review processes in borrowed from Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of 
International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press 2011), at 242. See also Savaresi, ‘The 
Paris Agreement’ (n 52). 
59
  This conceptualisation of review processes is made in Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of 
International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press 2011), at 242. I relied on this 
conceptualisation also in Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement’ (n 52). 
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of its treaty bodies created a machinery to review of implementation and compliance that is rather 
sophisticated and advanced by MEAs standards.
60
 Under the Protocol, the reporting of 
information, and the process for the review of implementation of Parties’ obligations, are geared 
towards ascertaining fulfillment of developed countries’ emission reduction and limitation 
targets. These targets represent obligations of result,
61
 which are assisted by a rich set of 
obligations of conduct concerning the reporting of information, to enable the review of Parties’ 
implementation and compliance. These reporting obligations build and expand upon those already 
established under the UNFCCC.  
The UNFCCC contains only skeletal references to the review of implementation of Parties 
obligations and is not endowed with a compliance mechanism. Nevertheless, with the emergence 
of a pledge and review approach to climate change governance in 2009, Parties’ reporting 
obligations under the UNFCCC were increased in frequency and expanded in scope, including 
new elements, such as, for example, the provision of assistance to developing countries.
62
 The 
review processes for developed and developing countries, however, remained differentiated.
63
 
The review of compliance was carried out only under the Kyoto Protocol, and only in relation to 
developed countries. The review of effectiveness of action, instead, was unsuccessfully attempted 
with the so-called 2013-2015 Review,
64
 and did not result in a process to adjust Parties’ level of 
ambition. 
The UNFCCC and the decisions adopted by its treaty bodies have over the years established a 
facilitative process to provide information on the implementation of their obligations, which does 
not attach consequences to lack of compliance. While implementation of these arrangements has 
only recently begun, it has already evidenced some shortcomings.
65
 First, the lack of a standard 
template to report pledged mitigation action before 2020 hindered comparison between Parties’ 
efforts. Unsurprisingly, implementation of the review arrangements under the UNFCCC has 
shown that the reporting of information in a transparent and complete manner is harder where no 
standard definitions and/or methods exist.
66
 Second, the review process under both the Kyoto 
                                                     
60
  As argued for example also in Renee Lefeber and Sebastian Oberthür, ‘Key Features of the Kyoto 
Protocol's Compliance System’, Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (Cambridge 
University Press 2011), 77; and Meinhard Doelle, ‘Compliance and Enforcement in the Climate 
Change Regime’ in Erkki Hollo, Kati Kulovesi and Michael Mehling (eds), Climate Change and the 
Law (Springer 2012), 165. 
61
  For a reflection on the differences between obligations of conduct and obligations of result, see: 
Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Obligation of Result Versus Obligation of Conduct: Some Thoughts About the 
Implementation of International Obligations’ in Mahnoush H Arsanjani and Jacob Cogan (eds), 
Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2010); and Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On 
Ago’s Classification of Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State 
Responsibility’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 371. 
62
  Decision 1/CP.16, at 42. 
63
  Decision 1/CP.16, 44-46 and 63-64. 
64
  Decision 1/CP.16, at 4 and 138. 
65
  As noted for example in Jane Ellis and Sarah Moarif, ‘Identifying and Addressing Gaps in the 
UNFCCC Reporting Framework’ (OECD 2015) 
  <http://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/Identifying-and-addressing-gaps.pdf>  
 accessed 24 February 2016. 
66
  As reported in Ellis and Moarif (n 66), at 4. 
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Protocol did not provide means to ‘ratchet up’ ambition over time and align with 
recommendations received from climate scientists. Third, developing countries have struggled to 
comply with their increased reporting obligations under the UNFCCC,
67
 thus drawing attention to 
the need for dedicated assistance and capacity building.  
The Paris Agreement builds and expands upon existing review procedures under the UNFCCC,
68
 
potentially addressing these shortcomings. The Agreement provides for the development of a set 
of rules to standardize Parties’ reporting of information.69 A Capacity-building Initiative for 
Transparency is set to support developing country Parties in meeting their enhanced transparency 
obligations.
70
 Most crucially, the Paris Agreement has largely leveled the approach to the review 
of implementation,
71
 which will build on and supersede extant arrangements.  
The Paris Agreement establishes the premises for the creation of a machinery to periodically 
review Parties’ efforts, both at the individual72 and at the aggregate level.73 Implementation of the 
Agreement will furthermore be assisted by an expert-based, facilitative compliance mechanism.
74
 
Even though the details of this compliance mechanism remain to be determined, it seems clear 
that it will follow what has been described as a ‘managerial’, rather than an ‘enforcement’ 
model.
75
 In other words, as under other MEAs, the Paris Agreement’s compliance committee will 
not so much coerce, but rather encourage compliance, enabling Parties’ consultation, cooperation 
and peer pressure. Yet, the very existence of a mechanism to consider questions of compliance 
for all Parties, rather than for developed ones only, is a major novelty. 
The possibility to create a Kyoto Protocol-like review of compliance for all Parties in the near 
future seems fanciful. Building upon the architecture developed under the Kyoto Protocol would 
however have obvious advantages. First, it would enable Parties to capitalize on experience 
accumulated with the implementation of extant rules and review processes, adjusting them to the 
specific regulatory needs arising under the Paris Agreement. Second, it would cater for the needs 
of Parties wishing to avail themselves of emission trading for climate change mitigation, enabling 
the tradability of credits across jurisdictions, as well as to attach consequences to non-compliance 
that have a strong bite. In an ideal world, rules adopted under the Kyoto Protocol would therefore 
be scaled up to apply to all Parties, after having been reformed to address shortcomings that have 
become apparent in their implementation.
76
 Whether Parties to the Paris Agreement have the 
political will necessary to build such a robust framework seems doubtful. Yet, it is vital that over 
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time all Parties move towards a robust framework for reporting and reviewing the implementation 
of their obligations.  
Finally, another novel aspect of the Paris Agreement is that alignment with the 2° C goal will be 
periodically assessed, by means of a so-called stock take exercise, which, at least in theory, will 
induce Parties to adjust their action over time.
77
 How this process will work in practice remains to 
be seen. Still, this global stock take already is an evolution when compared with the lack of 
means to ratchet up ambition under the UNFCCC. Here too, non-State actors can be expected to 
perform an important role, both in terms of the provision of information, as well as of means to 
put pressure upon Parties.
78
 
 
4. Conclusion: what the past tells us about the future 
The Paris Agreement can be regarded as an expression of political will to tackle climate change in 
a new way, and in conformity with the all-encompassing nature of the problem at hand. The 
Agreement also seems to mark a new start in international climate governance, through a bottom-
up approach to State action and greater non-State actors’ involvement. Compared with the 
UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement is a great leveler of Parties’ obligations, most saliently in relation 
to mitigation and the provision of information. Compared with the Kyoto Protocol, the 
diminished legal force attached to Parties’ substantive commitments is compensated by the 
ecumenical commitment to emission reductions, as well as by a unitary system for the review of 
implementation, compliance and effectiveness.  
From a law-making perspective, the adoption of the Paris Agreement is the beginning of a new 
lengthy regulatory season, whereby Parties will engage in a collective exercise to interpret and fill 
in with content the broadly worded obligations enshrined in the treaty. The history of 
international climate change law-making thus far indicates that crafting these rules is unlikely to 
be easy or quick. The first session of the subsidiary bodies after the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement has already shown that keeping this process orderly and efficient is paramount. In this 
process, Parties should resolutely tackle the institutional proliferation that plagues the climate 
regime, discarding processes and institutions that are no longer needed. 
From a governance perspective, it is vital that law-making under the Paris Agreement delivers 
adequate intergovernmentally-coordinated rules, without leaving excessive discretion to Parties. 
This is especially so in relation to the carbon integrity of Parties’ action. Even in a bottom-up 
architecture, the reporting of information concerning emissions and removals needs to align with 
rigorous and homogenous rules and review procedures, which should be applicable to all Parties. 
Another area where some coordination is indispensable is the development of common standards 
for emission trading. Experience with extant arrangements has revealed concerns over double 
counting and leakage. The secondary rules adopted under the Paris Agreement should tackle these 
concerns head-on, establishing common parameters to ensure the integrity of emission trading.  
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It would nevertheless be naïve to expect the Paris Agreement to be a miraculous cure for all the 
maladies of the climate regime. While the adoption of a new approach to international climate 
governance was a matter of necessity, given the toppling of the approach embedded in the Kyoto 
Protocol, a change in architecture is not in itself a guarantee of success. The Paris Agreement 
leaves unsolved a series of difficult and unpalatable questions. The devil clearly is in the details, 
and in coming years much work will be needed to craft the rules to operationalize the related 
provisions and reach political compromise. 
Experience accrued with the implementation of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol is a 
precious term of reference to detect the pitfalls lying ahead, and how to avoid repeating the 
mistakes of the past. The Paris Agreement already encompasses new elements, which were 
missing or inadequately addressed in the existing climate architecture. It adopts a collective long-
term goal on climate change mitigation, to be supported by efforts from all Parties. It establishes a 
periodic process for the submission of information on Parties’ efforts, laying out the premises for 
their standardization over time, as well as for their review, both at the individual, as well as at the 
aggregate level. Most crucially, the Agreement has dismantled the differentiation firewall in the 
Kyoto Protocol, replacing it with a more flexible approach, which is cognizant of the need to 
involve all Parties in tackling climate change. All these factors augur well for a regime whose 
outlook has been rather bleak for quite a while. Only time will tell whether these auspicious signs 
have in fact marked a genuine palingenesis in international climate governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
